2025 versus 2026
How have we actually done?
Last year’s Budget was framed around strong foundations. This year’s offers breathing space. The change in language reflects a more difficult economic setting, but the useful test is numerical: what did the government expect then, what does the latest document report, and what has changed in the outlook?
On that test, the record is mixed. The 2026 document records 2025 GDP growth of 1.3%, below the 1.5% forecast in the previous Budget. Yet business investment grew 4.3%, against an earlier forecast of 2.8%. Britain has not simply underperformed on every measure. The weakness lies particularly in what comes next for purchasing power and private demand.
The same calendar years, compared across the two Budget documents| Measure | 2025 Budget | 2026 Budget | What changed |
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| 2025 GDP growth | 1.5% forecast | 1.3% outturn | Growth was 0.2 percentage points below the earlier forecast. |
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| 2026 GDP growth | 1.4% | 1.2% | A smaller expansion than expected last November. |
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| 2027 GDP growth | 1.5% | 1.0% | The next year’s expansion is forecast to be appreciably slower. |
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| 2027 household consumption growth | 1.5% | 0.6% | Less momentum in household demand. |
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| 2026 real disposable income per person | +0.2% | -0.8% | A 1.0 percentage-point deterioration in expected purchasing-power growth. |
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| 2027 CPI inflation | 2.0% | 3.4% | Price pressure is expected to persist for longer. |
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| 2025 business investment growth | 2.8% forecast | 4.3% outturn | A meaningful area of stronger recorded performance. |
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| 2027 business investment growth | +0.6% | -0.5% | Private-sector capital spending is forecast to contract. |
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| 2026 government investment growth | 7.8% | 14.6% | A stronger public-investment pipeline, with delivery risk. |
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| 2027 unemployment rate | 4.6% | 5.1% | A weaker expected labour-market backdrop; not a sales-specific forecast. |
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Source: Budget 2025, Table 1.1; Budget 2026, Table 1.1, printed page 25. Annual percentage growth unless the row specifies a rate. All entries are forecasts except the two explicitly marked 2025 outturn figures. Outturn is the vintage used in the 2026 forecast, not a guarantee against later statistical revision. Percentage-point differences compare rates, not the level of economic output.
The consumer recovery has become less convincing
The sharpest commercial signal is the reduction in expected household purchasing power. Last year’s forecast offered a modest 0.2% increase in real disposable income per person in 2026. The latest document expects a 0.8% fall. For sellers of discretionary goods and services, that points towards a customer who may postpone, trade down or require a more persuasive reason to buy.
The 2027 consumption forecast has also fallen, from 1.5% growth to 0.6%. That is a forecast of slower growth, not a fall in total consumption. The distinction matters: the market can expand while individual suppliers face tougher competition, smaller baskets or lower conversion.
Higher expected inflation compounds the problem. With 2027 CPI inflation now forecast at 3.4%, against 2.0% in the previous Budget, a larger sales figure may reflect price rises rather than more products sold. Sales leaders should track volume, gross margin, retention and cash alongside nominal revenue.
There has been progress, but it is uneven
The stronger 2025 business-investment outturn deserves recognition. So does the much higher forecast for public-investment growth in 2026. These figures challenge the idea that nothing is happening. They also explain why suppliers serving infrastructure and public programmes can face a different market from those dependent on discretionary consumer demand.
However, the 2027 business-investment forecast has moved from modest growth to a 0.5% contraction. A supplier selling machinery, consultancy or software therefore needs to establish which customers have approved capital, rather than treating a national investment announcement as evidence that private budgets have opened.
Policy is cushioning pressure rather than removing it
The 2025 Budget announced an adult statutory wage floor of £12.71 from April 2026. The 2026 Budget announces £13.21 from April 2027, another 50p an hour, or about 3.9%. That is a nominal statutory-rate comparison. It is not evidence that every salesperson has received a pay rise, nor that every worker is better off after inflation.
Similarly, the 2025 document’s headline energy-bill saving and the 2026 document’s £100 Household Energy Payment cannot simply be added together as a universal household gain. They differ in design, timing and coverage, and are set against a changing energy-price baseline. The relevant question for sales is how much disposable cash a specific customer has after essential costs.
What we cannot honestly claim yet
Neither Budget provides a comprehensive measure of sales professionals’ commission, target attainment, job security or real earnings across industries. Nor does comparing two forecasts isolate the effect of government policy. Global energy prices, interest rates, business decisions and statistical revisions also change the picture.
It would therefore be premature to say that salespeople are collectively better or worse off by a precise amount. UKSA’s defensible conclusion is narrower: the latest outlook presents a tougher near-term demand environment than last year’s forecast, alongside specific improvements in investment and targeted cost support.
What would count as a genuine improvement?
A convincing recovery for the profession would show up in stronger real customer spending, more approved private investment, improved retention, profitable sales growth and reliable commission earnings. For employers, it would mean better output per salesperson without an unsustainable increase in workload or discounting.
That is the standard against which the next year should be judged. A funding announcement is a starting point. The commercial result arrives when a customer commits, the supplier delivers and the invoice is paid.